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This paper introduces an approach to assess and improve the time-dependent resilience of urban
infrastructure systems, where resilience is defined as the systems’ ability to resist various
possible hazards, absorb the initial damage from hazards, and recover to normal operation one or
multiple times during a time period T. For different values of T and its position relative to current
time, there are three forms of resilience: previous resilience, current potential resilience, and
future potential resilience. This paper mainly discusses the third form that takes into account the
systems’ future evolving processes. Taking the power transmission grid in Harris County, Texas,
USA as an example, the time-dependent features of resilience and the effectiveness of some
resilience-inspired strategies, including enhancement of situational awareness, management of
consumer demand, and integration of distributed generators, are all simulated and discussed.
Results show a nonlinear nature of resilience as a function of T, which may exhibit a transition
from an increasing function to a decreasing function at either a threshold of post-blackout
improvement rate, a threshold of load profile with consumer demand management, or a threshold
number of integrated distributed generators. These results are further confirmed by studying a
typical benchmark system such as the IEEE RTS-96. Such common trends indicate that some
resilience strategies may enhance infrastructure system resilience in the short term, but if not
managed well, they may compromise practical utility system resilience in the long run. VC 2012
American Institute of Physics. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.4737204]
Urban infrastructure systems are vital to the operation
of modern society and its economy, yet they are unavoid-
ably subject to different types of hazards and are vul-
nerable to cascading failures within and across systems.
Hence, different from traditional system safety analyses
using scenarios or hypothetical accidents in an attempt
to understand their effects and the reasons for their
occurrence, the concept of resilience has been proposed
in acknowledgment of the unavoidability of hazards or
accidents. A number of articles have recently assessed
the resilience of systems under single and multiple haz-
ards. However, these studies neither address the evolv-
ing features of infrastructure systems due to the steady
increase of service demand and post-event improvement
efforts, nor address inter-hazards interactions, as the
occurrences and effects of future hazards may be
affected by previous ones. Capturing these unexplored
features leads to the proposal of a time-dependent resil-
ience metric for urban infrastructure systems. This pa-
per uses power transmission systems as examples to
show the time-dependent and nonlinear features of resil-
ience, and discusses the effectiveness of some resilience-
inspired strategies, including situational awareness (SA)
enhancement, consumer demand management, and dis-
tributed generators (DGs) integration, in order to
emphasize the need to carefully manage emerging smart
infrastructure techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION
Economic prosperity, public health and safety cannot be
achieved without the normal operation of critical infrastruc-
ture systems, including electric power systems, telecommu-
nications, natural gas and oil, banking and finance,
transportation, water supply systems, government services,
and emergency services.1 Most critical infrastructure is com-
posed of networked systems and exposed to different types
of hazards. The failures of some system components at the
local level may result in the disruptions of other components
via cascading failures, and may also affect other systems due
to interdependencies. For example, communities that lack
electric power, even for short periods of time, have trouble
meeting basic needs for food, shelter, water, law and order.2
Hence, traditional system safety analyses focus on scenarios
or hypothetical accidents in an attempt to understand their
effects and the reasons for their occurrence.3 Alternatively,
recent resilience analyses acknowledge that hazards or acci-
dents are unavoidable and attempt to improve system resil-
ience with respect to different possible hazards.
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Regarding the term “resilience,” scholars or institutes
from different fields have proposed different definitions.4–12
As a synthesis of the available literature, this paper defines the
resilience as the joint ability of infrastructure systems to resist
(prevent and withstand) different possible hazards, absorb the
initial damage, and recover to normal operation. Based on dif-
ferent definitions of resilience, many researchers have pro-
posed various methods or frameworks to quantify it and
assess it. One of the pioneer works in the field of infrastruc-
ture systems is from the Multidisciplinary Center for Earth-
quake Engineering Research (MCEER), which provides a
general framework to define and quantify the seismic resil-
ience of communities or any type of physical and organiza-
tional systems.9 Resilience in this framework includes four
properties: robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and ra-
pidity, while resilience itself is quantified with four interre-
lated dimensions: technical, organizational, social, and
economic. Based on this framework, there are many emerging
studies on the resilience assessment and quantification of per-
formance for practical utility systems to support resilience-
based decisions. These studies include the comparisons of
seismic resilience retrofit strategies in a water delivery sys-
tem,13 seismic resilience assessment for acute care facilities,14
hurricane resilience analysis for networked infrastructure sys-
tems,15 quantification of disaster resilience using an analytical
function which can fit both technical and organizational
issues,16 the formulation of adjusted resilience metrics with
the consideration of preferences and priorities of a given deci-
sion maker,17 the quantification of system resilience with the
consideration of recovery cost,12 and the proposal of a resil-
ience assessment framework adequate for both single and
multiple hazards.18
The above studies can be classified as static resilience
analysis because they keep the system initial parameters con-
stant and the resilience is measured by a static quantity. But
in practice, infrastructure systems are always evolving due to
the steady increase of service demand and post-event
improvement efforts, including enhancements of physical
component capacities, implementation of improved operation
standards and guidelines, focus on safety culture, and the
integration of new technologies, all of which result in the sys-
tem’s resistant, absorptive and restorative capacities chang-
ing as a function of time. Also, during the evolvement and
improvement processes, the occurrences and effects of future
hazards may be affected by previous ones so that there exist
inter-hazards interactions. These aspects cannot be captured
by static resilience analyses, requiring a method to quantify
resilience by a time-dependent metric that enables explora-
tion of the evolving and nonlinear features of resilience.
This paper introduces an approach to assess and improve
the time-dependent resilience of infrastructure systems. The
rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II introdu-
ces the time-dependent metric for resilience assessment. In
Section III, taking the power transmission grid in Harris
County, Texas, USA as an example, the time-dependent and
nonlinear features of resilience and the long-term effective-
ness of some resilience strategies inspired by smart grid tech-
nologies are all simulated and discussed. Section IV
discusses the contributions and robustness of the findings by
exploring diverse potential system evolution forces and
additionally studying a typical system such as the IEEE
RTS-96. Finally, Section V provides conclusions and future
research directions.
II. TIME-DEPENDENT RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT
Most research usually uses the system performance
response process following the occurrence of a hazard as
shown in Fig. 1 to quantify and assess resilience. The per-
formance response process can be divided into three differ-
ent stages: the disaster prevention stage (0 t t0), the
damage propagation stage (t0 t t1), and the recovery
stage (t1 t tE). These three stages together constitute a
typical response cycle, and can respectively reflect the sys-
tems’ ability to resist (prevent and withstand) possible haz-
ards, absorb the initial damage from hazards, and recover to
normal operation levels. In other words, system resilience is
determined by three system capacities: the resistant capacity
as the ability to prevent different possible hazards and reduce
the initial damage level if a hazard occurs, the absorptive
capacity as the degree to which the systems absorb the
impacts of initial damage and minimize associated conse-
quences, such as cascading failures, and the restorative
capacity as the ability to be repaired quickly and effectively.
However, many infrastructure systems are continuously
evolving. The occurrence rates and intensities of some haz-
ards, and the three system capacities all change with time,
leading to the unexplored time-dependent and nonlinear fea-
tures of resilience. Hence, this paper introduces a time-
dependent resilience metric. Within a time period from 0 to
T (with cases of sufficiently large T allowing for future sys-
tem evolution), denote the target performance curve by
TP(t), and the real performance curve by P(t), while system
resilience R(T) is quantified as the ratio of the area between
P(t) and the time axis to the area between TP(t) and the time
axis,
RðTÞ ¼
ðT
0
PðtÞdt
ðT
0
TPðtÞdt
: (1)
FIG. 1. Typical performance response curve of an infrastructure system fol-
lowing the occurrence of a hazard.
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Note that the value of R(T) is bounded in the range [0,
1]. During T, system responses under different possible haz-
ards are captured by P(t), which can contain none or many t0
to tE cycles. Hence, Eq. (1) fully captures the resistant,
absorptive, and restorative capacities of infrastructure sys-
tems. In addition, if the curves P(t) and TP(t) are measured
by different performance level metrics, such as the amount
of flow or services delivered, the availability of critical
facilities, the number of people served, or the enabling
potential of economic activities, Eq. (1) corresponds to the
technical, organizational, social, and economic dimensions
of resilience, respectively.9 This paper takes the amount of
flow delivered as the performance level metric, and focuses
on the technical dimension of resilience. Other dimensions
of resilience could be estimated as well provided adequate
system and contextual data. For example, if the fraction of
customers served is used as the performance level metric, the
social dimension of resilience9 can be assessed as it is similar
to a power system reliability metric used in the industry—
the average service availability index (ASAI), which is the
ratio of the total number of customer hours in which service
is available during a given time period to the total customer
hours demanded. However, even for the technical dimen-
sions and different from reliability analyses, which usually
model the hazards and the restoration processes by determin-
istic parameters or random variables with distribution param-
eters estimated from the historical data, the resilience
analysis requires modeling the emergency responses and res-
toration efforts in detail to analyze and compare the effec-
tiveness of improvements under different conditions. In
addition, different ranges of T yield different forms of
resilience.
First, when the time span 0 to T¼Tp represents a time
period in the past, the real performance curve P(t) can be
plotted from the recorded historical data but the targeted per-
formance curve TP(t) during the disruptive processes may be
difficult to ascertain if the selected performance metric, such
as the amount of flow delivered for technical resilience, has
a time-varying feature. In this case, the targeted performance
curve can be determined according to the real performance
curve trends, for instance, as a straight line between points A
and B (Fig. 1). Then, system resilience can be computed
from TP(t) and P(t) according to Eq. (1).
Second, when the time span 0 to T¼ Tc marks a period
ending at a current point in time there is a performance pro-
cess that cannot account for system evolution as the time is
just passing and no actions have taken place. Hence, system
parameters are all fixed, and the hazards can be modeled
according to empirical data up to that point. Then, resilience
can be simulated and computed from current system parame-
ters. As these parameters are all fixed, this resilience provides
an estimation of system performance at the current time point
and then can be called “current potential resilience.”
Third, when the time span 0 to T¼Tf marks a period
ending in the future, it considers the system evolving pro-
cess, and system parameters may be modified at each time
and after each accident or hazard event. With the evolvement
and improvement models, system resilience can also be
simulated and computed. Note that this resilience value
depends on the improvement strategies to be adopted; hence,
it can be called “future potential resilience.”
The first form of resilience is based on historical data
and can be easily computed from Eq. (1). The second form
of resilience has been studied already in another paper by the
authors.18 Hence, this paper mainly considers the third form
of resilience. Section III uses an example to illustrate the
technical aspects of resilience assessment and improvement.
III. EXAMPLE APPLICATION
This paper mainly uses the truncated power transmission
system in Harris County, Texas, USA shown in Fig. 2 as an
example to illustrate the technical resilience assessment and
improvement method. The original system data are obtained
from Platts.19 There are 417 nodes, in which 23 of them are
generator nodes. The reminder is a set of substation nodes, in
which the ones with degrees equal to one (57 nodes) are
assumed to be load nodes; the rest are transshipment nodes.
The nodes are linked by 551 lines with a total length of
2411.5 km. Due to the unavailability of power injections and
line susceptance data for security reasons, this paper assumes
that all lines have the same susceptance value of 1, and that
all lines have the same line capacity value of 0.475 with all
voltages equal to 1 in a normalized fashion. Also, for illustra-
tive purposes, assume that all nodes have the same power
injection, and their values make the maximum value of all
line flows 90% 0.475. The generator capacities are then set
as 1.2 times their generation. These parameter settings and
assumptions are all based on the work from Pepyne, and
deemed reasonable for the focus of the paper on resilience
analyses.20
A. Resilience assessment model
To obtain the TP(t) and P(t) functions in a period of
time 0 to Tf to quantify system future potential resilience,
hazards require modeling, as well as system cascading fail-
ures, restoration processes, and the long term evolvement
and improvement mechanisms.
Power systems are subject to different hazards types.
For illustrative purposes, this paper considers random haz-
ards and emerging internal hazards during the system
FIG. 2. A geographical representation of the power transmission grid in
Harris County, Texas.
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evolution process due to line overloads. The random hazards
are a collective name for hazard types that may include
equipment failures as well as hazards triggered by vegetation
(trees), animals, and human errors. They only cause a small
portion of the system components to initially fail and have
the typical features of variety and uncertainty so that their
occurrence can be modeled by random failures, where each
component possesses a representative failure probability.
To capture the internal cascading process, several mod-
els have been proposed in the last decade, including DC
based OPA models (a joint effort from the U.S. Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, the Power System Engineering
Research Center at the University of Wisconsin-Madison,
and the University of Alaska, where “OPA” is the combina-
tion of key letters from these three organizations),21,22 AC
based power flow models,23 hidden failure models,24 com-
plex network based models,25 and stochastic models.26
Based on these existing models, this paper uses the DC
power flow calculation to capture the main operation features
of the power system for computational efficiency and also
considers hidden failures along with operator and communi-
cation errors, which are frequent causes for blackouts in
practice.24,28,29
For the restoration, scholars mainly assign to each dam-
aged component a restoration time given a damage level
based on historical statistics.26,27 Finally, for the evolvement
and improvement mechanisms, this paper mainly considers
the load growth and the capacity improvement of overloaded
lines (with details in the simulation procedures introduced
later in this subsection). Other aspects such as network topol-
ogy along with component aging could be added in future
studies.
The above damage, restoration, and evolution aspects
lead to the nonlinear feature of power system performance
responses to different hazards. Hence, building upon the
introduced resilience metric, evidence from existing studies,
the investigations from several major blackouts, and the
common practices from the utility companies,28,29 this paper
uses the following resilience assessment model, in which the
time-dependent evolvement and improvement modules are
mainly based on the OPA model.21,22 The output is an esti-
mate of P(t) and TP(t) from 0 to Tf under pertinent hazards,
where the amount of total delivered power flow is the per-
formance level metric. The flow chart in Fig. 3 synthesizes
the method and follows these steps:
1. Set the start time t¼ 0.
2. Initialize or update system parameters, such as power
injections and line capacities. If t¼ 0, initialize the sys-
tem as the traditional power system. If considering some
smart infrastructure improvement strategies, as discussed
in Subsections III B–III E, it requires modeling such
interventions and adjusting the corresponding system pa-
rameter settings. If t> 0, system parameters may be fur-
ther updated based on two types of mechanisms. One is
based on the post-blackout improvement decisions intro-
duced in step 17. The other is the growth of power
demand. Each day the daily peak power demand for
each load substation is multiplied by a fixed parameter k
that represents the daily rate of increase in electricity
demand. The parameter k is set as 1.00005 based on past
electricity consumption in the United States, correspond-
ing to a yearly rate of 1.8%.22 In addition, to represent
the daily local fluctuations in power demand, all power
loads are multiplied by a random number uniformly dis-
tributed in the range of [1 r, 1þ r], where r is set as
0.20.21 Also, for each generator i, its capacity increases
proportional to the absolute difference between its cur-
rent capacity and the sum of its connected line capacities
until one of the following two conditions is satisfied: (1)
the sum of all generator capacities reaches 1.2 times the
total power demand; (2) the capacity of generator i
reaches the sum of its connected line capacities. In addi-
tion, with the daily peak demands, hourly power
demands can be also estimated based on the hourly load
profile if required, as discussed in Subsection III D.
Finally, at the current time point t in a daily or hourly
FIG. 3. Flow chart to simulate estimates of real system performance curves
P(t) and target performance curves TP(t) during a future period 0 to Tf.
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scale, the values of TP(t) and P(t) are identical and both
equal to the sum of total power loads.
3. Identify all main hazards acting upon the studied power
system, and model their frequencies and impact mecha-
nisms according to the hazard features. For illustrative
purposes, this paper only considers random hazards and
the emerging overload-induced hazards during the evo-
lution process. The random hazards are modeled by ran-
dom failures with a daily failure rate p0. For each power
line, generate a uniformly distributed random number nr
[ [0, 1], if nr< p0, then the line fails; otherwise, it
remains normal. The emerging internal hazards are cap-
tured in step 5. Also, for all initially damaged compo-
nents, assign to each of them a restoration time tr, which
is the sum of a variable e describing the arrival time for
dispatched resources and a variable g denoting the time
to repair the damaged components.
4. If there are damaged components, remove them from the
system. Run the DC optimum power flow (OPF) model
to get the new line flows from real power demand.22
5. Verify whether there are overloaded lines whose flows
exceed their capacities; if yes go to step 6, otherwise go
to step 7.
6. When there are overloaded lines in the physical systems,
and due to insufficient situational awareness (e.g., com-
munication interruptions, failures of the emergency man-
agement system, EMS), the dispatch center may fail to
make a DC OPF re-dispatch;28 this failure probability is
denoted by 1 d. If failed to make a DC OPF-dispatch,
then record all overloaded lines and go to step 7, or
directly go to step 7 if there is a successful re-dispatch.
The DC OPF re-dispatch is used to minimize the change
in generation or load shed subject to the system con-
straints, denoted by the following cost function:22
X
i2SP
jpi  Pij þ
X
j2LP
Wjpj  Pjj; (2)
where Pi (Pj) is the power injection for node i (j) before
re-dispatch and pi (pj) is the new power injection. Sp is
the set of generators and Lp is the set of demand nodes.
All generators are assumed to run at the same cost and
all loads have the same priority to be served. However,
the load shed is assigned a penalty factor W¼ 100 to
reflect power management practices. The minimization
of the cost function is done with the following con-
straints:22 (1) total power generated and consumed
should be identical:
P
k[Vp(pkPk)¼ 0, where Vp is the
set for all nodes; (2) power flow through each line ij
should be less than its capacity jfijj Fijmax, ij [ Ep,
where Ep is the set of all power lines; (3) power pro-
duced by each generator i should be less than its
capacity: 0 piPimax, i [ SP; and (4) ensure load shed-
ding (pjPj) is positive and less than the absolute value
of initial load Pj so that: Pj pj 0, j [ LP. This optimi-
zation problem can be transformed into a standard linear
programming (LP) problem. The solutions are the new
power injections of the nodes and the power flows
through transmission lines.
7. For each line connected to the end of the failed lines and
exposed to hidden failures for the first time, test its fail-
ure with probability hp.24 If failed, assign to the line a
repair time, which is the sum of e and g. Also, over-
loaded lines are assumed to be all tripped due to various
reasons. If the lines are tripped by normal relay opera-
tions, they can be reconnected without dispatching repair
crews, and their repair time is zero; if the lines are
tripped with damage, such as contact with trees, some
repair efforts are required, and each damaged line is
assigned a repair time, which is the sum of e and g. The
probability of overloaded lines failed with damage is
denoted by fd.22 The probability variables hp and fd are
informed by historical data or previous studies and their
values are set at the end of this subsection.
8. Verify whether there are failed lines; if yes, remove
them from the system and go to step 4 to keep simulating
the cascading failure; or go to the step 9.
9. Record the current simulation time, with the value of
P(t) as the current total power delivered, and the value
of TP(t) the same as its value assigned in step 2.
10. Verify whether there are damaged lines, if yes, go to
step 11 to start the restoration process, otherwise, go to
step 16 to judge whether there is load shedding.
11. Move to time t¼ tþ te, where te refers to the emergency
response time for failure detections and restoration
decisions.
12. Restore the damaged and unrestored components
with the minimum restoration time min{tr}. Move to
t¼ tþmin{tr}.
13. Reconnect all restored components, and then make a DC
OPF re-dispatch. If it reduces the current total power
supply, cancel the reconnection and go to step 12; other-
wise, keep the reconnection and then go to step 14.
14. Record the simulation time, the value of P(t) as the cur-
rent total power delivered, and the value of TP(t) as its
value assigned in step 2.
15. Verify whether all components have been restored. If
yes, go to step 16; otherwise, go to step 12 to keep
restoring the remaining damaged components.
16. Verify whether there is load shedding, if so, determine
the time ts to restore the shed loads and then move the
time t¼ tþ ts. Restore all loads, record the time. The
values of P(t) and TP(t) are identical and both equal to
the total power delivered or the value of TP(t) set in step
2, Then, go to step 17. If there is no load shedding, go
directly to step 17.
17. Verify whether the simulation time reaches the value Tf,
if yes, go to step 18 to end. Otherwise, make improve-
ment decisions, move the time to a new day (or the next
hour if the simulation runs at a hourly scale) and go to
step 2. Here, similar to the OPA model,21,22 engineering
post-blackout improvement is simplified into a parame-
ter of post-blackout improvement rate u, which takes
effect after the blackout events. This means the capaci-
ties of all overloaded lines during the last blackout are
multiplied by the constant parameter u. Also, note that in
practice there is a day-ahead market which can affect the
next-day load allocations, especially when the demand is
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higher than the total supply and then it needs to shed
load for balance. This feature is simply modeled in step
2 by daily local fluctuations while step 6 can capture the
load shed if necessary.
18. End.
Note that the target performance curve TP(t) is simply
fixed as a constant line during each blackout event, which
does not affect the following discussions in this paper. How-
ever, given a daily and hourly load profile, a time-dependent
TP(t) can be also easily simulated to compute the resilience
based on the above procedures.
For the same time period from 0 to Tf, repeating the
above steps yields different realizations of the evolving pro-
cess, which corresponds to different resilience values to
capture uncertainties. Random hazards are modeled by ran-
dom failures with a daily failure rate p0¼ 0.00015 from his-
torical data.30 For other parameters, based on reality and
common practices, their values are set as follows: for resto-
ration time tr¼ eþ g, where the variable e is assumed satis-
fying the uniform distribution [0, 3 h] and the variable g
satisfying the exponential distribution with mean value
5 h.26 During the cascading failures, the hidden failure
probability hp¼ 0.005;24 the probability of overloaded lines
failed with damage fd¼ 0.3;22 the time required to restore
shed load ts¼ 8 h;31 the probability of OPF dispatch d is
first set as 0.95; the emergency response time is first set as
te¼ 3 h; and finally, the post-blackout improvement rate is
first set as u¼ 1.01.21,22
Some parts of the assessment model are based on previ-
ous models, while the impacts of some parameters settings
have already been discussed in the existing literature,21,22,24
such as small hp and fd which can reduce the cascading fail-
ure sizes. Thus, this paper does not emphasize parameter sen-
sitivity analyses to mainly study the time-dependent features
of resilience (Subsection III B) and the impacts of some
improvement techniques, feasible for emerging smart infra-
structures, including situational awareness enhancement (Sub-
section III C), consumer demand management (Subsection
III D), and distributed generation integration (Subsection
III E).
B. Time-dependent features of resilience
The resilience metric R(Tf) has a time-dependent fea-
ture, depending on the time span 0 to Tf under consideration.
During the system evolution process, an influential parame-
ter is the post-blackout improvement rate u (step 17). For
large u, there should be less frequent blackouts as well as
small cascading failure sizes. To illustrate the impacts of Tf
and u, this paper simulates the TP(t) and P(t) functions for
the next ten years 500 times, and then calculates the resil-
ience values under different Tf from 1 yr to 10 yr with a step
of 1 yr (a period of 10 yr is short enough for the system to
evolve without major topological changes and long enough
to evolve to new steady states).
As the reliability of the power system is very high
(99.97%),32 the resilience R(Tf) also has a high value. To
clearly differentiate among resilience values, this paper
presents the resilience value through a logarithmic transfor-
mation –log10(1R(Tf)), which is an increasing function
with respect to R(Tf). Specifically, if the value of R(Tf)
includes n 9’s in its decimal portion, the value of
–log10(1R(Tf)) is in the range [n, nþ 1). For example, if
R(Tf)¼ 0.9997, then 3 –log10(1R(Tf))¼ 3.52< 4. Fig.
4(a) shows the logarithmic form of resilience
–log10(1R(Tf)) as a function of Tf under several typical
values of u, while Fig. 4(b) presents the resilience variation
at Tf¼ 1 and 10 under different post-blackout improvement
rates. The error bars with 98% confidence intervals are also
displayed.
The figures display two significant features. First, with
the increase of u, system resilience R(Tf) at a given Tf
increases (because of the identical variation tendency for
R(Tf) and –log10(1R(Tf)), results also illustrate the varia-
tion of the resilience R(Tf)). Trends are consistent with prac-
tical expectations. For large u, the system will always have
enough capacity to absorb the disturbances and there will be
less frequent blackouts as well as smaller cascading sizes, so
the system is more resilient. For small u, the system has
insufficient absorptive capacity and the system can collapse
with constant blackouts, and the system resilience is compro-
mised. Second, and less intuitive, with the increase of u the
resilience as a function of Tf changes from a decreasing
FIG. 4. (a) The logarithmic transforma-
tion of resilience –log10(1R(Tf)) under
several typical values of post-blackout
improvement rate, u. The error bars with
98% confidence intervals are also dis-
played. (b) Resilience with Tf¼ 1 and 10
under different post-blackout improve-
ment rates, u.
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function to a constant line to an increasing function. This
nonlinear phenomenon is because increasing u from 1.001 to
1.1 changes the system from a state dominated by power
demand growth (more frequent blackouts and larger cascad-
ing sizes) to a state dominated by post-blackout improve-
ment efforts (less blackouts and smaller cascading sizes).
Specially, if u> 1.1, the system can quickly evolve to new
resilience levels.
C. Impact of situational awareness enhancement
Lacking adequate SA may lead to serious consequences
and has been identified as one of the primary factors in previ-
ous blackouts.28,29 In the future smart grids, situational
awareness can be improved in many aspects relative to
today’s SA systems, as with the deployment of advanced
monitoring sensors, and the installation of advanced visual-
ization tools in control rooms.
In the proposed resilience model, the impact of SA can
be reflected in each of the three resilience stages. In the dis-
aster prevention stage, SA can facilitate early warnings, so
that the daily failure rate p0 decreases. In the cascading fail-
ure stage, SA can help operators in the control room make
fast and accurate emergency decisions when facing the
appearance of overloaded lines while minimizing the possi-
ble load shedding, which can be partially reflected by the
OPF dispatch probability d. In the restoration stage, SA can
accelerate the restoration decisions and lead to efficient res-
toration procedures, which can be partially mirrored by the
emergency restoration time te. To study the effect of SA, this
paper simulates resilience variations under different values
of p0, d, and te. The simulation results are presented in Fig.
5. The error bars with 98% confidence intervals are also dis-
played. The error bars are wider for Tf¼ 1 relative to Tf¼ 10,
which is mainly because Tf¼ 10 is long enough for the sys-
tem to evolve in to a new equilibrium level and display supe-
rior resilience for different SA parameter settings. However,
the error bars, even for Tf¼ 1, are still small in practical
terms under different values of p0, d, and te, which indicates
strong robustness for the resilience estimation.
Also, from the figures, when SA is improved, i.e.,
decreasing the daily failure rate p0, increasing the OPF
dispatch probability d, and reducing the response time te, the
resilience values at any given Tf all increase. For a base case
with p0¼ 0.00015, d¼ 0.95, and te¼ 3 h, the logarithm form
of resilience –log10(1R(1)) is 3.848 at Tf¼ 1. If the cost of
different improvement actions is known, the best strategy for
resilience improvement can be found through comparing the
ratio of resilience enhancement magnitude to the strategy’s
cost. As a particular case, the cost for the following strategies
is identical: p0 reduces to 0.00005, d increases to 1, and the
emergency response time te reduces to 2 h; hence, the corre-
sponding logarithmic form of resilience –log10(1R(1))
changes to 3.963, 3.851, and 3.967, respectively. Then, it
FIG. 5. Resilience variation for Tf¼ 1
and 10 under different SA parameter set-
tings, with u¼ 1.01: (a) initial failure
probability p0, (b) OPF dispatch proba-
bility d, and (c) emergency response
time te. The error bars with 98% confi-
dence intervals are also displayed.
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can be found that the reduction on p0 and te is effective while
the enhancement of d is the worst strategy.
D. Impact of consumer demand management
As the smart grid deployment unfolds, “smart appli-
ances” and “intelligent equipment” will be installed in homes
and businesses, interconnecting with energy management
systems in “smart buildings.” These technological advance-
ments will enable consumers to better manage energy use
and reduce energy costs, leading to likely flattened hourly
consumer load profiles. To analyze the effect of consumer
demand management, the simulation is run in an hourly
scale. In step 2 of the simulation procedures, after getting
substation daily peak power demand, this paper assumes that
hourly power demands are normalized by the peak power
demand following the “traditional” curve in Fig. 6. For illus-
trative purposes, if considering demand management, the
hourly load profile is assumed to change from the traditional
curve to the smart grid curve 1 in Fig. 6. These two tradi-
tional and smart grid 1 curves keep the power consumption
constant, i.e., the integral of the traditional curve in the range
[1 h, 24 h] has an identical value relative to the smart grid
curve 1. The smart grid curve 1 can be marked by the nor-
malized average load demand hLi¼ 0.745. Also, as utility
owners usually seek to maximize line utilization, hLi may
evolve to the smart grid curve 2 in the long run. This section
simulates resilience under the traditional curve and the smart
grid curve 1, and also analyzes the resilience variations dur-
ing the evolving process from the smart grid curve 1 to the
smart grid curve 2. Fig. 7(a) presents the resilience results
under a traditional load profile and several typical load pro-
files with demand management, including the levels for smart
grids 1 and 2, and Fig. 7(b) shows the resilience variations at
Tf¼ 1 and 10 under demand management with distinct hLi.
From the figures, two interesting results can be found.
First, if the demand profile changes from the traditional
curve to the smart grid curve 1 (hLi¼ 0.745), resilience
increases. Also, when hLi increases from 0.745 to 1, the re-
silience at any given Tf is compromised. Typically, at Tf¼ 1,
the resilience reaches the traditional resilience level
99.991% (4.05 for –log10(1R(1)), under the traditional
load profile) when hLi is at around 98%. This indicates that
demand management can largely improve the utilization of
the line capacities, and hLi can increase from 0.745 to 0.98
with the expectation that the resilience level is not lower
than the traditional resilience.
Second, with the demand management and the increase
of hLi, the resilience curve R(Tf) experiences a transition
from a decreasing function to an increasing function at criti-
cal hLi¼ 0.975 (also shown at the intersection of the two
curves in Fig. 7(b)). This nonlinear phenomenon is mainly
because small hLi not only reduces the grid congestion and
blackout frequency, but also cuts down the post-blackout
improvement actions. The former can initially increase resil-
ience, while the latter makes the demand growth exceed the
post-blackout improvement efforts and the network becomes
more and more congested in the evolution process, leading
to more blackouts until the demand growth and post-
blackout improvement efforts can balance again. But a small
hLi also makes the system have a strong absorptive capacity,
which requires a long time to reach the new equilibrium
state. So, the resilience levels at Tf¼ 1 and 10 are close for
small hLi but depart significantly as hLi increases, giving
advantage to the large Tf at the maximum hLi.
E. Impact of distributed generation integration
The future smart grids can easily integrate many types
of distribution generation into the systems, leading to two-
FIG. 6. Hourly load profiles for load substations with and without demand
management.
FIG. 7. (a) Logarithmic form of resil-
ience –log10(1R(Tf)) under traditional
load profile and several typical daily
load profiles with demand management;
(b) Resilience variation at Tf¼ 1 and 10
under demand management with distinct
average daily load profiles, hLi.
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way power flows.2 This integration can reduce power grid
congestion and improve system efficiency, reliability, and
flexibility. Recent studies have shown that a local generator
can be connected into the power systems as a constant load,
source or zero loads to the grid.33 To deploy DGs, two types
of strategies are considered. In strategy S1, the DGs are ran-
domly deployed at the load substations. In strategy S2, the
DGs are deployed at the load substations which have the
minimum network efficiency from the central generators (the
original generators). The network efficiency E(j) for a load
substation j [ Lp is defined as follows:
EðjÞ ¼ 1
NS
X
i2SP
1
dij
; j 2 Lp; (3)
where NS is the number of central generators, and dij is the
shortest path length from central generator i to load substa-
tion j. When a DG is deployed, its capacity is assumed to be
1.2 times the initial demand of the corresponding load sub-
station, and the capacity keeps fixed in the future evolution
process. Based on these assumptions, for each deployment
strategy, the resilience is simulated and computed under dif-
ferent number ndg of DGs. Fig. 8(a) shows the logarithmic
form of resilience under several typical ndg levels with ran-
dom deployment, and Fig. 8(b) shows the resilience variation
at Tf¼ 1 and 10 under deployment strategies S1 and S2 for
different values of ndg.
From the figures, it can be found that for the random
deployment strategy S1, with the increase of ndg, the system
resilience increases for a given Tf while the resilience R(Tf)
transits from an increasing function to a decreasing function
over entire ranges of Tf values. The threshold ndg for trend
transition is at around 15, accounting for 26% of the total
number of load substations Fig. 8(b). The transition is mainly
because the larger the ndg, the less congestion in the power
grid; consequently, there are less frequent blackouts and less
post-blackout improvement actions on the power system, so
the system is more resilient in the first years of operation af-
ter intervention. But with the daily increase of power
demand, insufficient post-blackout improvement actions
make the system become congested again, leading to more
blackouts until the post-blackout improvement actions can
catch up the demand increase. Finally for large Tf, the system
reaches another resilient level, which is worse than the initial
resilient state with DGs, but still better than the resilient state
without DGs.
A similar nonlinear phenomenon to the one described
above also occurs to the minimum network efficiency based
deployment strategy S2, as shown in Fig. 8(b), but the
threshold value of ndg is reached at around 5 (8.8%). Also,
the strategy S2 is more effective than the strategy S1 at any
given ndg. This is because if a load substation has small net-
work efficiency, it is far from the central generators and then
it is easy to disconnect from the network under cascading
processes. Deploying DGs to these low efficiency substations
can effectively bring more system capacity to absorb the dis-
turbances and get less cascading sizes relative to the random
deployment. Particularly, when deploying only 5 DGs, at
Tf¼ 1, the strategy S2 can bring a resilience value of
99.995% (4.34 for –log10(1R(1))) compared to the resil-
ience value 99.990% (4.02 for –log10(1R(1)) under strat-
egy S1.
However, this paper only shows that different deploy-
ment strategies bring different resilience. Whether there are
better strategies and how to find the optimum strategy is out-
side the scope of this study but it will be a future research
direction.
IV. DISCUSSIONS
The findings in Sec. III, despite using artificial power sys-
tem parameters for resilience analysis, still provide sugges-
tions for long-term resilience management. Also, note that the
results shown in Figs. 4–8 may vary for different power sys-
tems due to the various topological, geographical, and opera-
tional parameters, so this paper mainly focuses on the
introduction of the time-dependent resilience concept and
shows the need for careful management of smart grid techni-
ques. These two contributions are further discussed as
follows:
1. Time-dependent resilience analyses are more helpful for
decision support on long-term resilience management
than static resilience analyses. The static resilience analy-
sis mainly models the hazard frequencies and intensities,
the cascading failures and restoration processes, and then
FIG. 8. (a) Logarithmic form of resil-
ience –log10(1R(Tf)) under several
typical ndg numbers of distributed gen-
erators with the random deployment
strategy, including ndg¼ 0, 5, 15, 25,
which account for 0%, 8.8%, 26.3%, and
43.9% of the total number of load sub-
stations, respectively; (b) resilience vari-
ation at Tf¼ 1 and 10 under random
deployment strategy S1 and minimum
network efficiency strategy S2 with dif-
ferent numbers of distributed generators,
ndg.
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produces a multiplicity of performance curves TP(t) and
P(t) during [t0, tE] for resilience assessment under specific
disruptive events (or scenarios),9,12,15–17 single haz-
ards13,14 or multiple hazards.18 This static resilience is
usually measured by a static quantity, which can be used
to find optimum strategies to improve system resilience.
In addition, despite some recent proposed resilience met-
rics with certain time-dependent features,34 which are
aimed at specific disruptive events to measure system re-
silience in time t [ [t0, tE] as a function of the performance
drop at time t and the maximum performance drop after
time t0, they can still be regarded as static resilience
because like other static studies the system initial parame-
ters are kept constant. This paper proposes the concept of
time-dependent resilience with the additional modeling of
system evolvement and improvement mechanisms. This
proposed resilience analysis approach can also capture
possible inter-hazard interactions during system evolving
processes, such as the occurrences and effects of future
hazards which are affected by previous hazards, and can-
not be addressed by static resilience analysis. Hence, this
approach can better assess the long-term effectiveness of
resilience-inspired intervention strategies to support deci-
sion making from a long-term perspective.
2. Simulation results from other practical power systems
with more realistic system parameters also show similar
trends of smart grid intervention effects on resilience,
emphasizing the need of careful management of smart
grid techniques. Although this paper uses artificial power
system parameters to study the time-dependent features of
resilience and the long-term effectiveness of some
resilience-inspired strategies, the results are not sensitive
to such parameter details because the initial system pa-
rameters only change the resilience level at low Tf levels,
while the long-term resilience variations observed in
Sec. III are mainly driven by two potential forces during
system evolvement and improvement processes. One is
the slow service demand growth in time, which increases
system congestion and compromises resilience; the other
is the post-blackout improvement efforts after each black-
out, which decreases system congestion and enhances re-
silience. If fixing the magnitude of demand growth k and
without smart grid upgrades, there exists a threshold value
of the post-blackout improvement factor ut, around which
the two forces balance and the resilience remains constant
with little fluctuation around the average resilience
[ut¼ 1.002 in Fig. 4(a)]. Above such a threshold, the resil-
ience is an increasing function of Tf while below it R(Tf)
is a decreasing function of Tf. However, the threshold
value ut is not constant and it is affected by the system ini-
tial state, where smaller initial congestion levels corre-
spond to larger values of ut. The smart grid techniques,
such as demand management and distributed generator
integration, can assuage system initial congestion levels
and lead to larger values of ut for smaller hLi or larger
ndg. When u is set less than ut in the traditional system,
the adoption of smart grid techniques, which increase the
value of ut, causes the value of u to always be below ut
and then only produce a set of decreasing curves of R(Tf)
for different values of hLi or ndg (results not shown in the
paper); when u is set larger than ut in the traditional sys-
tem, the adoption of smart grid techniques can cause the
transition from the case u> ut to the case u< ut, which
results in the transition of R(Tf) from an increasing func-
tion to a decreasing function at a threshold value of hLi or
ndg, as shown in Figs. 7(a) and 8(a) for decreasing levels
of hLi or increasing levels of ndg. To further support these
results, this paper also analyzes the time-dependent resil-
ience of the single-area IEEE Reliability Test System
RTS-96 (Ref. 35) with the consideration of demand
growth and post-blackout improvement efforts. This sys-
tem is specified with realistic operational parameters,
although simulation results and associated figures are not
shown in this paper, except for some synthesized
comments.
Overall, the IEEE RTS-96 example is not congested
initially and each line has power flow far from its capacity
limitation. Hence, this system has a high resilience level in
the first year with a logarithmic value of –log10(1R(1))
¼ 5.21, and the threshold value ut to balance the two forces
is 1.2, around which the resilience R(Tf) keeps a constant
line and below which the resilience decreases as a function
of the time period. To explore the effects of different u and
smart grid interventions, at any u< 1.2, more flattened daily
load profile and more deployment of distributed generators
do not change the monotonicity of the resilience function,
i.e., R(Tf) is still a decreasing function when increasing hLi
or increasing ndg. At any u> 1.2, the resilience function
R(Tf) is an increasing function of Tf before adopting the resil-
ience strategies considered in Sec. III, but then non-linear
transitions from an increasing function to a decreasing func-
tion occur at a threshold value of the average daily load pro-
file hLi or a critical value of the number of distributed
generators ndg. Specially, at u¼ 2.0, hLi has the threshold
value at around 0.949, and ndg has the threshold value of 3,
accounting for 17.65% of the total number of load substa-
tions, and highlighting that additional interventions can
become counterproductive in the long term. The test system
is also used, to confirm the robustness of resilience evolution
trends to initial system parameters by running the IEEE
RTS-96 system with parameter settings as suggested in
Sec. III in lieu of the realistic parameters of the systems, and
similar trends for the time-dependent evolution resilience are
also obtained. These simulation results show that different
initial system parameter settings and different levels of post-
blackout improvement efforts (modeled by u), there always
exist the possibility of the resilience function R(Tf) to
become a decreasing function when adopting smart grid
techniques, which indicates that these techniques may
improve system resilience in the short term, but if not man-
aged well, they may compromise future resilience in the
long run.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Different from the static resilience analysis which
assumes system initial parameters constant and measures re-
silience by a static quantity, the time-dependent resilience
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analysis additionally models system evolvement and
improvement processes and captures possible inter-hazards
interactions. Taking the power transmission grid in Harris
County, Texas, USA and the IEEE RTS 96 system as exam-
ples, this paper explores the features of resilience under dif-
ferent post-blackout improvement factors, and different
resilience strategies, including situational awareness enhance-
ment, demand management, and distributed generators inte-
gration. The results show that when the post-blackout
improvement factors are small, the resilience curves are
always decreasing functions at different levels of integration
of smart grid techniques; when the post-blackout improve-
ment factors are large, the resilience curves exhibit a transi-
tion from an increasing function to a decreasing function at
either a threshold load profile with demand management, or a
threshold number of distributed generators. These results
indicate that the adoption of some strategies may be effective
in the short term, but if not managed well, they may compro-
mise resilience in the long run or may consume limited
resources unnecessarily.
This paper only considers a few resilience improvement
strategies and evolvement mechanisms, while some other strat-
egies and evolvement mechanisms, such as topological adjust-
ments, the acknowledgment of interdependencies,36 the
addition of new generators, substations and lines, and the
retirement of some components due to economic reasons, fail-
ures, or environmental regulations, are all required to support a
network-based life-cycle resilience analysis and discuss the
associated nonlinear features (with Tf¼ several decades). Also,
besides the random hazards and the emerging hazards due to
line overloads, the addition of other types of hazards, such as
earthquakes and hurricanes, as well their interaction of effects
due to the allocation of improvement resources, enables a
more comprehensive resilience analysis. In sum, this paper
paves the way to develop a mature tool to design and improve
evolving infrastructure systems and their resilience by account-
ing for their nonlinear nature in the short and long run.
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